Fear Appeal as Coercion Versus Persuasion in a Democracy: The Power of Islamic Discourse in the Indonesian Public Sphere by Suwarno, Peter
ISSN 0852-7172 (p) 2461-064X (e) 
© 2019 Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan  
http://journal.walisongo.ac.id/index.php/walisongo 251
Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan
Vol. 27 No. 2 (2019) pp 251-278
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21580/ws.27.2.4971
FEAR APPEAL AS COERCION VERSUS PERSUASION 
IN A DEMOCRACY: THE POWER OF ISLAMIC 
 DISCOURSE IN THE INDONESIAN PUBLIC SPHERE
P E T E R  S U WA R N O * 1
School of International Letters and Cultures, Arizona State          
University, Tempe, Arizona, United States.
Abstract
While Indonesia claims to be the world’s third largest democracy, 
it recognizes itself as both a secular and religious state. The ne-
gotiation of the state-religion relationship influenced by Islamic 
discourse continues to shape the socio-political development of 
this largest Muslim nation. This paper describes how Indonesia’s 
discursive contention is molded by the power and popularity of Is-
lamic discourses. It will present examples and analysis of appeal to 
fear as coercive discourses from recently published speech events, 
debates, edicts, regulations, and publications as well as examine 
the vital role of Islamic discourses in the Indonesian public sphere 
and democracy. This paper concludes that coercive religious dis-
courses and some government policies not only marginalize the 
voices of minority and opposing groups, but also curtail participa-
tive critical debates that are necessary for a democratic Indonesia.
Walaupun Indonesia mengklaim sebagai negara demokrasi ter-
besar ketiga di dunia, Indonesia mengakui dirinya sebagai neg-
ara sekuler dan agama. Negosiasi hubungan negara-agama yang 
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dipengaruhi oleh wacana Islam terus membentuk perkembangan 
sosial-politik negara Muslim terbesar ini. Makalah ini menjelaskan 
bagaimana perselisihan diskursif Indonesia dibentuk oleh kekua-
tan dan popularitas wacana Islam. Penelitian ini akan menyajik-
an contoh-contoh dan analisis ‘propaganda ketakutan’ sebagai 
wacana koersif dari pidato yang baru-baru ini diterbitkan, debat, 
dekrit, peraturan, dan publikasi serta memeriksa peran vital wa-
cana Islam dalam ruang publik dan demokrasi Indonesia. Maka-
lah ini menyimpulkan bahwa wacana keagamaan yang bersifat 
koersif dan beberapa kebijakan pemerintah tidak hanya memar-
ginalkan suara-suara kelompok minoritas, tetapi juga membata-
si perdebatan kritis partisipatif yang diperlukan untuk Indonesia 
yang demokratis.
Keywords: coercion; democracy; equal participation; Islamic 
discourses; public sphere.
Introduction
A frequent claim about Indonesia is that it is the most pop-
ulous Muslim majority nation, the third largest democracy, and 
the fourth most populous country in the world, as well as a dem-
ocratic nation that identifies itself as both a secular and religious 
state.2 Throughout its journey of democratic transition, Islam 
has been an inextricable force in forming the direction of Indo-
nesian politics as well as in shaping the discourses on state-re-
ligion relationship. Nonetheless, while the implementation of 
democracy in many Muslim majority nations is challenging, it 
seems to work quite well in Indonesia, such that world leaders, 
experts, scholars and commentators frequently use Indonesia as 
an example for justifying the compatibility of Islam with democ-
racy (Menchik 2016).
2 Although constitutionally a secular state, the Indonesian government 
recognizes six official religions, with Islam having an increasingly powerful 
influence in Indonesian politics. For more discussion, see Seo (2012).
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In addition to the Islam-democracy debates, issues of hate 
speech, intimidation and violence based on ethnicity, religion, 
race, and inter-group relations, known as “SARA”,3 continue 
to inundate the Indonesian socio-political development. This 
leads to the inevitable Islamic identity politics that have creat-
ed socio-political challenges such as tension and conflicts that 
emerged throughout the history of independent Indonesia. The 
Indonesian Islamic “conservative turn” described by Ricklefs 
(2012), supported by Bruinessen (2013), has enhanced the in-
fluential role of Islamic discourses in various venues concern-
ing not only political matters, but also daily life issues such as 
gender, marriage, tourism, film, banking, foods, and clothing. 
This power of Islamic discourses in Indonesia may be attribut-
ed not only to the nature of less-contested faith-based discours-
es, which often employ fear appeals, but also to the enactment 
and enforcement of religiously inspired government regulations 
(Cammack and Feener 2012).
With the above observation, a question should be raised 
concerning what is the state and the future of Indonesian de-
mocracy. There are many ways of answering this question, but 
this paper focuses on one crucial aspect of theories of democracy 
(Dahl 1989), i.e. citizen participation through freedom of ex-
pression, especially the use of language and discourse in shaping 
Indonesian democracy. Discourses in a democracy must inev-
itably concern the discussion of the public sphere (Habermas 
1962), where, to be successful, the discursive contention in any 
society must be civil, voluntary, unthreatening, and emancipa-
tive. Considering recent development of Islamic discourses in In-
donesia, one can assess the type of dominant discursive practices 
in Indonesian democracy. 
3 SARA, which literally stands for Suku (ethnicity), Agama (religion), 
Ras (Race), and Antar golongon (intergroup), is a common term used to refer 
to tension and conflicts among various groups based on discrimination on 
these sensitive issues.
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This paper shows that the “conservative turn” can lead to 
unequal participation by the multiplicity of existing groups in 
the public sphere due to coercive discourses, especially con-
cerning religiously related issues by some conservative Islamic 
groups. This paper presents some examples and analysis of the 
use of fear appeals as coercive discourses in the forms of widely 
discussed texts from various events, publications, debates, and 
fatwas as well as examine the vital role of Islamic discourses and 
government rules that shape the Indonesian public sphere and 
democracy. These issues are complicated because, religious dis-
courses are not always readily subject to critical argumentation, 
worsened by government regulations that restrain freedom of 
speech for equal democratic participation. When the Indonesian 
people accept faith-based coercive discourses and support gov-
ernment regulations forbidding criticism, it signifies a decline in 
the quality of Indonesian democracy.
Democracy and Citizen Participation in the Public Sphere
Dahl (1989) calls democracy in advanced countries “pol-
yarchies,” defined by their free and fair elections, inclusive suf-
frage, rights to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative 
information, and autonomy of association. He underlines that 
ideal democracy requires adequate and equal opportunities for 
effective participation on preferred matters, equal voting rights, 
ample and equal opportunities for choice of interests, oppor-
tunities to decide what issues that matter most, and the inclu-
sion of all citizens. His emphasis on equal rights for citizen par-
ticipation intersects perfectly with Habermas’ (1962) belief in 
equal, empowering democratic participation for shaping public 
opinions that influence politics, criticize state power, and oppose 
special interest or sectarian groups. Habermas’ (1962; 1989) 
“The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere” described 
an ideal democracy whereby public sphere should be an open 
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discussion of all public issues through freedom of speech and 
assembly as well as the right to freely participate in political 
debates and decision-making. 
Concerning the idea on the active participation of religious 
groups in public sphere, and Rawls’ (1997) argument about pub-
lic reason, Habermas (1989) suggests how religious voices and 
traditions of different communities, influenced by the separation 
of state and religion, could still play a role in the public sphere. 
This question is especially important for a religiously plural so-
ciety such as Indonesia, because, according to Habermas (1962) 
and Rawls (1997), democracy prevails only when there is rea-
sonable pluralism. They agree that religious communities repre-
sent an important voice of a society that can be included in the 
public sphere, if they translate their beliefs and doctrines into 
reasonable arguments.
Similarly, Rawls (1997, 801) argues that religious principles 
can become a “comprehensive doctrine” and thus become rea-
sonable only if they support a pluralist democracy with equal 
rights for all citizens regardless of their religious or non-reli-
gious backgrounds. Religious doctrines, which tends to be sec-
tarian, cannot lead to an agreement or mutual understanding 
when the supposedly reasonable arguments are based on irrec-
oncilable beliefs and faiths. The challenge, as described in the 
next sections, is that a recent increase in Indonesian Islamic con-
servatism seemed to have led to an upsurge in the dominance 
of faith-based sectarian Islamic discourses with limited critical 
debates, equal participation, public reasons, and plural rational 
arguments.
The Power of Islamic Discourse in the Indonesian Public Sphere
While many claims that Indonesian Islam is tolerant, 
open-minded, and pluralistic, as promoted during the Soeharto’s 
regime (1966-1998), conservatism and radicalism have tainted 
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the image of moderate Indonesian Islam, since the demise of the 
New Order regime, mostly due to the rise in religiously motived 
coercions. Although the culprit is frequently attributed to small 
radical Islamists mostly linked to international organizations, 
some scholars have searched for the root of the growing conser-
vatism in Indonesia (Bruinessen 2013; Ricklefs 2012). 
According to Bruinessen (2013), Indonesian Islam has tak-
en a significant “conservative turn,” such that the moderate, 
progressive, and liberal Islam that prospered during the New 
Order regime began to fade after the reform era of freedom of 
speech. Conservative groups that have been sidelined during the 
Soeharto’s regime now have the freedom and venues to express 
their agenda. Bruinessen (2013) also argued that the spread of 
Wahhabi, as well as other transnational Islamic ideologies and 
movements, has been largely unchallenged, weakening the prom-
inence of Nahdlatul  Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah as the 
two largest and most influential moderate Islamic organizations.
Ricklefs (2012) agrees with Bruinessen (2013), describing 
this conservative turn as a threat to Indonesian democracy be-
cause the rise of conservatism has increased the cooperation and 
collusion between powerful politicians and conservative Islamic 
groups. The erosion of democracy is attributable to the discours-
es of the conservatives and the radicals that share many similar 
interpretations of Islam in Indonesia. The difference is that the 
radicals tend to engage in disruptive or violent actions. In con-
trast, conservatives tend to engage in discursive campaigns such 
as fatwas and other public statements that play essential roles in 
the Indonesian public sphere. This influences the belief system 
of the society and inspires their leaders’ speeches and even the 
radical groups’ actions. 
Ricklefs (2012) thinks that conservative Islamic discourse 
has penetrated Indonesian society deeply, shaping the public 
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sphere that is now difficult to reverse. Minority groups “cannot 
hope for a secular public space but must hope for a religiously 
neutral one, in which all beliefs can take part on equal terms” 
(Ricklefs 2012, 212). Unfortunately, the discourses of Indone-
sian Muslims have been unequally represented by religious vocal 
leaders and preachers with unchallenged sectarian messages. 
While Islamic discourse has been increasingly prominent 
since the time of the reform era, Ricklefs (2012) saw the govern-
ment of Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) gave Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia (MUI, the Council Indonesian Ulama) more power to 
assert on Islamic issues as the beginning of a significant conser-
vative turn. Although SBY did it for political support due to the 
increasing popularity if Islamic conservatism, it had a significant 
impact on the discursive power of the Islamists. Religious dis-
courses have significantly shaped Indonesian politics, such that 
competing candidates felt pressed to show how much more Is-
lamic they were than the other candidates. 
Kersten (2015) and Menchik (2016) agreed with Ricklefs 
(2012) that the ramification the MUI’s authority given by SBY 
had empowered the already conservative council in their issuing 
of fatwas. With conservative Islam as a central political theme, 
the moderate, pluralist, progressive versions of Islam were mar-
ginalized, filling the public sphere with faith-based coercive dis-
courses that tend to be non-emancipative, discouraging critical 
debates and public reasons necessary for fostering participative 
democracy.
Coercion Versus Persuasion: the Use Fear Appeals in Indonesian 
Discursive Contestation
Coercion is commonly defined as any compliance-gaining 
efforts, verbal or behavioral, that use any form of intimidation, 
threats and fear of punishment or retaliation (Feinberg 1998). 
This practice usually uses some forms of pressures that result in 
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compelling other individuals or groups to act involuntarily. The 
term “involuntary”, meaning free to choose or reject, is essen-
tial, because, as Wertheimer (1987, 14) argued, people’s legiti-
mate action, behavior, and speech were founded on free will or 
“voluntariness principle.” 
Frequently contrasted to the term “coercion” is “persua-
sion,” commonly defined as “the act of addressing arguments 
or appeals to a person to induce cooperation, submission, or 
agreement” (Oxford 2009). It is the process of influencing others 
free of threats or fear. Kenneth Burke (1969, 50), confirms that 
“persuasion involves choice, will,” and the freedom to express 
any motives for any goals. Dahl (1989) describes “rational per-
suasion,” as the ideal way of convincing others by relying on 
explanation of truth and “coercion” as the worse undemocratic 
strategy.
Associated with coercion and persuasion is the use of fear 
appeals to gain compliance. As rhetorical strategy of manipu-
lating the audience’s emotion, fear appeal can either be coercive 
or persuasive (Foa and Kozak 1986; Pfau 2007). Pfau (2007) 
suggested “civic fear” as the appropriate and civil way of using 
fear appeals which is basically the same as rational persuasion 
that gives room for critical debates. 
Scholars of discursive argumentation describe fear appeals 
as coercion using the term “argumentum ad baculum,” which 
literally means “an argument on a stick”, i.e. an argument that 
“turns on a threat or reference to dire consequences” (Woods 
1998, 493). The fear appeals as coercion in the ad baculum cre-
ates a deceptive argumentative means because a speaker asserts 
truth of a proposition based on fear, threat, and force or “fear 
of force (leading to) acceptance of a conclusion” (Carney 1980, 
390) and the “abandonment of reason” (Copi 1990, 130). This 
suggests that religious discourses that frequently avoid the pub-
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lic reason and critical debates can be labeled coercion since 
they rely on an appeal of fear (e.g. of afterlife punishments) and 
“abandonment of reason” (divine truth that can’t be wrong).
Andrews (1969, 10) believes that persuasion and coercion 
are both rhetorical processes in a continuum, and that “rhetoric 
becomes less persuasive and more coercive to the extent that it 
limits the viable alternatives open to the receivers of communi-
cation.” Similarly, Smith (1982) stresses the role of perception 
of the existence of threat, fear, and choice determines degrees of 
persuasiveness or coerciveness. Each discourse must be assessed 
whether or not and how much it signifies or contains fear and/
or threat (coercive) or choice and freedom to accept or reject 
(persuasive). To do this, one must look closely at the contexts, 
including the speakers’ motives and the audience as well as the 
situation of the speech event. Thus, important questions to ask 
to evaluate any discourse include: Does the text/speech contain 
any form of threat? Does it create fear? Does the audience have 
any opportunity and freedom to disagree or refuse? Does the 
text/speech allow critical debates that might change/modify the 
mind of both the proponents or the audience? If the answer to 
the first two questions is positive, this is an example of a coer-
cive discourse, while if the answer of the last two question is 
positive, this is an example of persuasion.
Examples of Islamic Fear Appeals as Coercive Versus Persuasive 
Discourses
There are numerous examples of coercive and persuasive Is-
lamic discourses in Indonesia, with or without fear appeals. An 
excellent example of the coercive nature of fear appeals applies 
to the abundant use of afterlife images of torment in hell, backed 
by holy texts believed and portrayed to contain absolute truths 
that are rarely debatable. Images of torments of hell used in reli-
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gious discourses, is not unique to Islamic discourses. Fundamen-
talist Christians have employed the same scare tactics (Walton 
2000), at least since the famous Jonathan Edwards’ description 
of hell house in the 1740s when he created fear invoking psy-
chosomatic reactions among his audience using ghastly images 
of hell (Jackson 2007).
The same images and their effects are ample in different In-
donesian Islamic discourses creating not only fear of death and 
hell, but also “culture of fear” (Glassner 1999).4 This is depicted 
in the widespread images in comics and religious speeches, as 
well as in television programs containing not only “siksa nera-
ka” (torment of hell), but also “siksa kubur” (torment in graves) 
(Ishadi 2011). The Indonesian people have been continuously 
bombarded with graphic punishments such that there is a cul-
ture of fear of torments during the afterlife (Tim CNN Indone-
sia 2019a; 2019b). With no significant critical debates or public 
reasons, but based only on doctrines and religious texts, such Is-
lamic discourses can lead to submission without questions and, 
thus, can be classified as coercion.
There are Islamic speeches and publication on specific type 
of punishments for certain behaviors, including, among many 
others, torments for: not doing the five-times-a-day prayers,5 
not fasting during the month of Ramadhan,6 wives refusing hus-
bands’ desire for sex,7 women not wearing the hijab (veil),8 and 
consuming haram (forbidden, not kosher) foods.9 Depiction of 
4 The excessive use of fear appeals in today’s communication has created, 
what Barry Glassner (1999) calls massive “culture of fear” created by differ-
ent agents for various purposes, including religious, political and economic 
interests. 
5 See for example Mutiara Islami (2018) and Sahroji (2017).
6 See for example PortalMadura.com (2018)
7 See for example Syukri (2018) and Alhaddad (2019).
8 See for example Galipat (2015) and Tuasikal (2017).
9 See for example Benih Iman Islam (2019) and Rosalia (2016).
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torments is abundant in comics as well as some books, such 
as the one titled 1001 Siksa Kubur: Berdasarkan Al-Quran dan 
As-Sunnah (1001 Torments of graves: Based on the Quran and 
Islamic traditions & practices) which contain some rewards but 
mostly punishments based on each type of wrongs or sins.10 
These types of coercive discourses have compelled many to sub-
mit and follow the directions of preachers and clerics not only 
religiously, but politically, preventing participative argumenta-
tion using public reasons.
Some of the most powerful Islamic discourses through-
out the development of Indonesian politics and democracy are 
the fatwas by the MUI. The fact that MUI’s fatwas tend to stir 
controversies and debates is not necessarily non-coercive since 
many are against democratic principles, such as those against 
pluralism, secularism, and liberalism.11 With the fatwas support-
ed by ultra-conservative intimidating Front Pembela Islam (FPI, 
Islamic Defender Front) and GNPF-MUI12 As well as other sha-
ria and caliphate supporter groups, MUI fatwas become power-
fully coercive.
This is true concerning fatwas that have created fear among 
minority groups, since these kinds of edicts can spark intimida-
tion and violent actions. For example, since the issuance of the 
MUI edict declaring that the Ahmadiyah group deviated from 
Qur’anic teachings reconfirmed in 2005, Islamic vigilante mil-
itants have launched violent attacks against the Ahmadiyah in 
different parts of Indonesia. This creates tremendous fear and a 
10 The book by Abdul Rahman (2014) is not a scholarly publication. The 
third chapter is all about different types of specific torments in graves.
11 See for example, the MUI’s fatwa opposing pluralism, secularism, and 
liberalism, in Hasyim (2015).
12 Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (GN-
PF-MUI, National Movement to Safeguard the Council Indonesian Ulamas’ 
Fatwa).
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sense of insecurity among law-abiding citizens, Ahmadiyah fol-
lowers as well as other minority religious groups. Unfortunately, 
the government of Indonesia created the nationwide anti-Ah-
madiyah decree issued in 2008, banning the Ahmadiyah from 
evangelizing their faith. To reduce violent actions, in most cases, 
the government blamed the victims rather than punishing and 
stopping the attackers. This is why law-abiding minority groups, 
are the ones that are not only unable to freely express their inter-
ests, issues and concerns, but also in fear of their life and future.
Another example is when on December 14th, 2016, MUI is-
sued an edict, stating that it is haram (forbidden) for Muslims to 
wear or use any non-Islamic objects, i.e. Christmas parapherna-
lia during the Christmas season. The consequences of these type 
of edicts are that several merchants were threatened by some 
Islamic extremists, such as GPNF-MUI, accusing the merchants 
of forcing their employees to wear Christmas-related gear. No 
merchants who feel threatened by this fatwa dared to reject and 
argue against the fatwa; thus, it gives no choice nor freedom for 
expressing different opinions. The fear effect of the powerful 
coercive fatwa continues throughout recent Christmas seasons.13
The power and coerciveness of MUI’s fatwas are due to 
MUI’s religious, political, and legal authority, regardless of nu-
merous criticisms against it. Its political-religious charisma has 
helped it gained official regulatory authority giving it more pow-
er and opportunities to set Islamic political agenda as well as to 
mobilize mass rally or even create threats of violence (Menchik 
2019).
One of the most popular Islamic discourses by conservative 
leaders and preachers is by Habib Rizieq leader of FPI who, in 
13 In fear of sweeping by some Islamic groups, Malang Mall management 
advised tenants against displaying Christmas accessories. See The Jakarta 
Post (2019).
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his sermon during the December 2, 2016 mass rally in Jakarta, 
stated: “… hukum Allah di atas segalanya. Tidak ada hukum 
yang paling adil dan lebih baik daripada hukum Allah,” “God’s 
law is above all laws. There is no law that is better and more 
just than God’s law”) (Pratiwi and Gumilang 2016). This prop-
osition has become the foundation of many speeches put for-
ward by conservative Islamic preachers, leaders and caliphate or 
sharia supporters on various occasions. This coercive discourse, 
frequently realized in the form of sharia laws, uses the power 
of God with the absolute truthfulness and supremacy of divine 
laws as a direct attack against the audience’s submission to the 
state law.
The effect “conservative turn” is also enhanced by the pop-
ularity of sharia and sharia-inspired laws in various Indonesian 
municipalities, constituting coercive discourses frequently ex-
ploited by secular leaders for political gains. As Buehler (2016) 
explains, there is no significant criticism against the secular lead-
ers supporting sharia law to expand their constituency and ac-
cumulate power. The effectiveness of sharia-based discourses is 
due to the fact that, grounded on Islamic doctrines and faith, 
it is exclusive, creating fear and threats among the critics and 
minority groups, because any criticism against sharia laws is 
deemed an attack against the divine supremacy of Islamic teach-
ings. The secular state leaders’ support for this type of coercive 
religious discourse for political power (Buehler 2016) only fur-
ther diminishes rational and equal participative debates which 
are essential for a democracy.
Another example is a rampant coercive discourse with dis-
crimination and hatred that took place around the time of the 
run-off election of the governor of Jakarta on April 19, 2017. 
This popular discourse cited a Qur’anic verse literally interpret-
ed to forbid Muslims from electing a non-Muslim as their lead-
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er. This stirred other preachers and Muslim leaders’ discourses 
against the election of the only Christian and Chinese candidate, 
Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok). In contrast, there are some 
Islamic persuasive discourses, e.g. by the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 
Chairman, Said Aqil Siroj, who stated that Muslims are allowed 
to choose or vote for non-Muslim leaders, suggesting that Ahok 
could become governor of Jakarta (Alhafiz 2016). This persua-
sive discourse did not create a threat, it gave freedom of choice, 
and anyone can disagree or critically debate the issue with prac-
tically no consequences.
The coercive discourses were especially widespread during 
the campaigns, there were threats and fear appeals in various 
forms, including several mosques putting up banners stating: 
“Masjid ini tidak mensolatkan jenazah pendukung dan pembela 
penista agama” (this mosque will not hold a funeral prayer for 
the bodies of the supporters and defenders of a blasphemer) (Hi-
dayat 2017). Those that did not comply would not receive the 
mosque funeral prayer—an essential ritual for a Muslim.
The controversial blasphemy case against Ahok was exploit-
ed to mobilize a series of mass demonstrations, that went on 
even after his election defeat. Amin Rais made a widely-pub-
lished statement during the final phase of Ahok’s trial: “Jika 
Ahok dihukum ringan, Jokowi jangan berharap presiden lagi” 
(if Ahok received only a light punishment, Jokowi can’t expect 
to be a president any longer) (Portal Islam 2017). This coercive 
discourse did not give any freedom to the judges while the legal 
case is still in process. This threat was real as it could have been 
enforced through a mass rally, potentially bringing down the 
Jokowi government (Fealy 2016). The discourses created fear 
among the Indonesian people, the judges, and the president that 
some dreadful events might take place if Ahok were not severely 
punished.
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The following mass rallies of the 2-December Alumni As-
sociation Movement (known as 212 Movement)14 held since 
2016 constitutes a powerful discourse using fear appeals with 
prevailing political impacts. It constitutes a threat to Jokowi’s 
political power leading in his political move of accommodating 
more conservative Islamic leaders into his government15 as well 
as Jokowi’s other policies of “authoritarian turn” (Power 2018).
A similar fear and threat characterize the discourses sur-
rounding the conviction and 18-month imprisonment in August 
2018 of Meliana, a Buddhist woman who was convicted of reli-
gious blasphemy for complaining about a mosque’s loudspeaker 
volume near her house in Tanjungbalai, North Sumatera. Many 
offended Muslims staged the worst anti-Chinese riot in Indone-
sia since 1998, burning or ransacking Buddhist temples, stoking 
more fear among Indonesian minorities.16
That said, there were a number of persuasive, non-coercive 
discourses that invited critical debates. A classic example of this 
is a controversial article entitled “Menyegarkan kembali pema-
haman Islam” (Rejuvenating the Islamic Understanding), writ-
ten by a Muslim liberalist, Ulil Abshar Abdalla (known as Ulil), 
which appeared in Kompas, 18 September, 2002. This article 
was not only a criticism of the literal interpretation of Islam-
ic absolute truthfulness and supremacy, but also was an invita-
tion to contextualize interpretations as well as to think, discuss, 
and even debate. However, this persuasive discourse that invites 
14 Similar to FPI, 212 is a militant Movement that successfully brought 
down Ahok. See a description and discussion of 212 Movement in Sheany 
(2018).
15 Jokowi felt compelled to choose Ma’ruf Amin, the chairman of the 
Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI) and a very conservative supreme leader 
of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) as his running mate due to the coercive discourses 
against him by the Islamist hardliners. See The Asean Post (2019).
16 See for example, Greg Fealy’ essay (2018) on the troubled of Indone-
sian minority living in fear.
P E T E R  S U WA R N O
Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan 266
debates, commonly practiced in democratic countries, created 
fury from various conservative groups and a few months later in 
2003, a group of Indonesian Islamic clerics from Forum Ulama 
Umat Islam (FUUI, Forum of Scholars of the Indonesian Um-
mah) issued a death fatwa against Ulil. Discourses containing 
the popular idiom of “halal darahnya” (someone’s blood is per-
mitted to be shed) is clearly a coercive discourse.
Others have fatwas about Islam that invited a debate and 
provided a choice with no threats but created controversy. For 
example, a prominent Islamic scholar, Quraish Shihab, who 
stated that there is no guarantee of entering paradise for any-
one, including the Prophet Muhammad. This statement empha-
sizing the importance of God’s mercy constitutes persuasive, a 
non-threatening discourse that encourages critical debates but 
not fear,17 yet led to much controversy, forcing him to clarify 
(Agama Menjawab 2018). This proves that Islamic coercive dis-
course tends to overpower the persuasive and critical one.
Not all of MUI’s edicts are coercive. For example, the edict 
issued on January 22, 2014, which required all Indonesia Mus-
lims to actively participate in protecting endangered species such 
as rhinos, tigers, orangutans, and elephants. This first fatwa has 
no direct reference to specific Islamic teachings followed by edu-
cation awareness programs. This persuasive discourse creates no 
fear and has been part of the principle embraced by the majority 
of the planet’s population.
There are a large number of persuasive, non-coercive Islam-
ic discourses launched by various moderate and progressive Is-
lamic groups and individuals. However, since they do not create 
fear, Islamic persuasive discourses lack public attention, stir no 
controversy and, thus, do not have a significant social-political 
effect.
17 See Quraish Shihab’s arguments in Rosidi (2014).
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The Dominance of Islamic Discourses in the Indonesian Democ-
racy
Habermas’ (1989) and Rawl (1997) agreed that there should 
be room for religious discourses in the public sphere, but those 
religiously-based principles should be translated into public lan-
guage and values accessible to the general public for emancipa-
tive and critical debates. This is important because: 1) the ra-
tional truthfulness of religions is mostly based on faith and not 
reason, 2) criticism and critical studies of religious doctrines are 
usually not acceptable in religious discussion, and 3) consensus 
is practically impossible when the rational arguments of differ-
ent religions contradict the each other.
Crowley (2006)”properties”:{“formattedCitation”:”(2006 
also confirmed that arguing against religious discourses in com-
munities filled with passionate religious commitment, even in 
democratic nations, tends to be complicated. This creates hege-
monic discourses in the public sphere, which goes against the 
tenets of democracy. This is also true in the Indonesian public 
sphere, where Islamic discourses tend to be dominant in the so-
cio-political arena and the public sphere in general, especially 
since and due to the “conservative turn” period. This dominance 
is inevitable because most Islamic organizations have tremen-
dous socio-political power and influence, such that most In-
donesian minority groups (ethnic or religious) are reluctant or 
afraid of criticizing or debating this situation.
In most cases, the major contestations are among Muslims 
themselves, i.e. the very conservatives versus the moderates. This 
is so, because many minority groups, who are often the subjects 
of the contention itself, are playing it safe by not participating. 
The debates, for examples, on whether Muslims are allowed 
to say, “Merry Christmas” to Christians, are among Muslims 
themselves. Many of the coercive Islamic discourses are directed 
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against minority religious, cultural, and political groups, such as 
Ahmadiyah, Shia, Christians, LGBTs, and the alleged Commu-
nist Party sympathizers. This is one of the reasons why Islam is 
often viewed as incompatible with democracy because one of the 
fundamental principles of democracy is participative communi-
cation involving exchanges of ideas and critical debates between 
and among equal and plural members of the societies and/or 
their representatives. This democratic principle is difficult to put 
into practice when the discourses are religiously based, coercive 
and not rationally persuasive, such as the implementation of un-
debatable religious law. What makes it even more challenging is 
that the conservatives and hardliners tend to interpret religious 
texts literally resulting in its truthfulness solely based on faith 
and not on critical historical arguments or public reasons, thus, 
limiting critical debates by those who are outside of the faith.
Unfortunately, the uninformed Muslims tend to accept un-
critically any religious discourse, despite showing sectarian and 
unfair arguments, defying the principle of civil discourse in a 
democracy. Opinions accepted by the majority is more import-
ant than the strength of the arguments. Even those who are ed-
ucated enough tend to be sidelined due to the campaign that 
only selected experts in Islamic fields are allowed to propose 
any interpretation critically.18 In addition, with the blasphemy 
law, alternative interpretation can be viewed as criticism of the 
religious doctrines, that in turn can be perceived as an attack on 
the faith and religion itself, thus, blasphemous. 
Menchik (2016) argues that the “conservative turn” does 
not necessarily lead to the decline of Indonesia’s democracy, 
viewing this phenomenon as a dynamic of a democracy of a 
majority Muslim country filled with contention between the re-
18 There has been agreement among Muslims that only some faithful ex-
perts can interpret the holy texts. See, for example, an article in Fauzi (2016).
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ligious militants and the moderates. This is in line with Haber-
mas’ (1989) and Rawl’s (1997) arguments that religious politics 
such as this does not necessarily threaten democracy as long as 
they are channelled through a democratic process, relying on 
public reasons. The problem is that these religious politics are 
under the direct control of the outspoken clerics and preachers, 
whose influential coercive discourses discourage critical argu-
mentation.
The 2017 Jakarta’s governor election proves that relying on 
procedural democracy does not guarantee the continuance of 
a democracy. The election went well, but the events leading to 
the voting day were full of numerous verbal and behavioral co-
ercion in the form of speeches and banners loaded with hatred 
and threat.19 With no fair and plain playing field for the com-
peting candidates, it is challenging to consider this a democracy, 
because, based on Dahl’s (1989) and Habermas’ (1989) demo-
cratic theories, there is no equal rights and freedom of choice or 
expressions, but much fear and threats.
Power (2018) argues that the decline in the Indonesian de-
mocracy is due to Jokowi’s “authoritarian turn,” pointing to his 
government’s policy of curtailing the power and influence of his 
political opposition, most of whom are Muslim conservatives 
and hardliners. However, Jokowi’s “authoritarian turn”, at least 
partly, is attributable to the Islamic “conservative turn,” with 
its consequent coercive discourses that created fear among the 
people and the president himself, compelling the government to 
conform.
To fight these dominant, coercive, and undemocratic dis-
courses, Jokowi cannot rely only on democratic persuasive dis-
courses. Instead, Jokowi must employ coercive discourses, using 
19 An example of reports on hate speeches and threats during the cam-
paign is Chew (2017).
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the founding principles of the state, which is relatively undebat-
able and guarantees plurality in terms of SARA. For this, Joko-
wi revives the state discourse of Pancasila that has been key in 
Jokowi’s effort to maintain national unity. Under the banner of 
Pancasila, however, Jokowi has sidelined voices of Islamic rad-
icalism, including among others, the banning of Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI), an organization that promotes international 
caliphate, and not extending the permit of FPI,20 an organiza-
tion that promotes sharia law. These constitute a state coercive 
discourse, creating some apprehensions among the supporters of 
sharia law and the caliphate. While in a democracy, a state has 
the right to compel all citizens to abide by the country’s princi-
ples and the law, Jokowi also dismissed his political opponents 
in different ways (Power 2018). Even after winning the election 
for his second term, Jokowi continues to show his “authoritari-
an turn” by, among other things, strengthening the enforcement 
of de-radicalization efforts,21 Especially by cracking down the 
alleged rise of Islamic radicalization among the civil servants.22
Criticism against Jokowi’s policies as being undemocratic 
ignores the challenges of fighting undemocratic religious coer-
cive discourses by using only democratic means. In this era of 
the “conservative turn,” the Indonesian government has limited 
20 See debates on extending the organizational permit of FPI in Tim CNN 
Indonesia (2019c).
21 After the October 2002 Bali bombings by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the 
Indonesian government established a deradicalization program under Badan 
Nasional Penanggulangan Teroris (BNPT, the National Counter-terrorism 
Agency).
22 In response to surveys showing signs of increased radicalism among 
Indonesian civil servants, the government urges reporting of their communi-
cation containing radicalism, using eleven criteria, the first two of which are: 
a) giving oral or written opinions containing hate speech against Pancasila, 
the 1945 Constitution, principle of diversity, united Indonesia, and the gov-
ernment, b) giving oral or written opinions containing hate speech against 
certain ethnic, race, religion, or groups. See Da Costa (2019).
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choices but implements the state’s coercive policies, including 
limiting free speech especially against the Pancasila State ide-
ology, the 1945 Constitutions, and the government. In other 
words, Jokowi is fighting the “conservative turn” (Bruinessen 
2013) with an “authoritarian turn” (Power 2018) or challenging 
faith-based coercive Islamic discourses with the Pancasila-based 
coercive state discourses. This may have led to the decline of 
the quality of Indonesian democracy for the sake of stability of 
a complexly plural society. One can only hope that the social, 
religious, and political conditions will allow more critical argu-
ments, public reasons, and equal participation in emancipatory 
debates, fostering a more democratic Indonesia.
Conclusion
This paper describes the type of public sphere that supports 
democracy and suggests the necessity of rational persuasive in-
stead of coercive discourses to augment citizens’ equal partici-
pation. In this Muslim majority country, Islam has become in-
creasingly conservative since the beginning of the reform era, as 
shown in the growing use and visibility of coercive discourses 
that frequently lead to intimidation and, in some cases, violent 
actions.
The dominance of conservative Islamic discourses and their 
tendency to be coercive is due not only to the “conservative turn,” 
but also to the fact that religiously-based principles are difficult 
to challenge in communities with strong beliefs in the supremacy 
and truthfulness of divine principles. Coercive discourses based 
on fear of exclusion, threat of the afterlife torments, or of being 
punished for blasphemy have been enhanced by the political-
ly dominant groups of sharia and caliphate supporters as well 
as secular leaders who exploited these discourses for political 
gains. Facing the challenges of dealing with these coercive dis-
courses that can endanger his government, Jokowi has used an 
“authoritarian turns” to fight the “conservative turns,” creating 
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state coercive discourses and policies that can lead to a further 
decline in the quality of democracy in Indonesia.
Only a small sample of Islamic discourses, both coercive and 
persuasive, are presented in this paper; more should be done 
to obtain a better understanding of various Islamic discourses 
in Indonesia. However, the small sample suggests that the con-
servatives and hardliners tend to produce most of the coercive 
discourses. In contrast, the discourses of the moderates and pro-
gressives tend to be critical, persuasive, and non-coercive. The 
success of the pursuit of democracy in Muslim majority Indo-
nesia will mostly depend on whether the Islamic persuasive and 
emancipative discourses will dominate the Indonesian public 
sphere.
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